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Abstract
This paper aims at assessing the optimal behavior of a firm facing stochastic costs
of production. In an imperfectly competitive setting, we evaluate to what extent a firm
may decide to locate part of its production in other markets different from which it is
actually settled. This decision is taken in a stochastic environment. Portfolio theory is
used to derive the optimal solution for the intertemporal profit maximization problem.
In such a framework, splitting production between different locations may be optimal
when a firm is able to charge different prices in the different local markets.
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1 Introduction
Profit maximization in a fully deterministic setting is the standard framework that epit-
omizes the rational behavior of a firm. This setting underpins the hypothesis of the risk
neutrality of the firm and most of cases it is not at odds with the fact. Nevertheless, when
evaluating, for instance, the location choice in markets different from the domestic one, a
fully deterministic setting does not seem to be suitable. The lack of full information about
the destination market can strongly affect the structure of costs of the firm once it decides to
delocate. This is a source of uncertainty and this fact makes it difficult to fully consider such
a problem in a simple deterministic setting. When taking its investment decisions, a firm has
to face uncertainty and, thus, a stochastic setting would better describe this framework. In
this sense, some empirical evidence supports this statement. A few empirical studies about
retail location decisions point out that firms always need to face uncertainty in demand or
market conditions once they decide to enter new markets (see for instance, Hernandez and
Biasiotto, 2001). In an applied study concerning the determinants of location by French
firms in Eastern and Western countries, Disdier and Mayer (2004) note that such firms
apply different strategies depending on the destination market. The uncertainty about the
possible issues in political, economic and legal matters affects the investment decisions for
Eastern countries. Furthermore, the authors find that French firms display important risk-
averse behaviour. They succeed in proving that the uncertainty related to the investment
return (embodied in the exchange rate volatility) inhibits the investment flows towards that
destination.
In spite of such evidence, the economic literature usually deals with the location problem
from a strictly deterministic point of view and location strategies are always taken for
granted. In economic geography (which recently proposed a new approach to the location
theory), location choices are driven by centripetal and centrifugal forces and most of the
attention is addressed to the fragmentation problem (Fujita and Thisse, 2003). Another
branch of the economic literature analyses the investment decision from the perspective of
foreign direct investments for which firm decisions are mainly taken with the purpose of
exploiting fiscal advantages as well as specific local resources (Devereux and Griffith, 1998).
Accordingly, the study of firm decision making in a stochastic setting seems to have
been partially glossed over from a very strictly microeconomic viewpoint. An exception can
be found in the seminal papers by Sandmo (1971) and Leland (1972) where a theory of firm
decision making under uncertainty is proposed.
Sandmo (1971) focuses on a typical competitive setting where a firm performs as a price
taker in a stochastic framework. The firm maximizes the expected utility of its profits. The
firm’s attitude towards risk is captured by a standard Von Newman-Morgenstern utility
function. At the equilibrium under uncertainty, Sandmo proves that the level of the output
is affected even by an infinitesimal increase in fixed costs. Furthermore, such a level is lower
than in the deterministic case. In order to increase the level of the output, Sandmo argues
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that a social planner should provide the firm with a per-unit subsidy whose optimal level
heavily depends on the value of its (constant absolute) risk aversion index. In the same
manner, he proves that an increase in the imposition (tax) rate does affect the level of firm’s
output which is proportional to its relative risk aversion.
Leland (1972) expands part of the analysis presented in Sandmo by formalizing the
assumption of demand uncertainty. His results are in the spirit of Sandmo’s and extend
his conclusions. He confirms that: (i) fixed costs affect the optimal value of the control
variable (prices and/or output), (ii) the firm is not neutral between quantity-setting and
price-setting behaviour, (iii) the optimal output is smaller when uncertainty increases, and
(iv) risk averse firms set lower quantity and price when risks decrease and marginal costs
are non decreasing.
Besides, one novelty of the approach by Leland (1972) is to stress a particular link
between his setting and the optimal portfolio literature. He asserts that in the theory of
the firm, changes in fixed costs may have the same effects as do changes in the initial
wealth invested in the risky assets in portfolio theory.1 This effect depends not only on the
absolute level of risk aversion, but also on the change in risk aversion due to profit or wealth
increases.2
The present study recovers part of the aim of Sandmo and Leland’s analyses. We
consider a setting where firms behave in a monopolistic competition way. Our purpose is to
describe the optimal behaviour of a firm that decides to partially delocate its production,
focusing on the way it chooses its location strategies. This is typically the situation of the
firm that switches from an export to a direct investment mode in order to penetrate into
new markets.3 Our framework is built around a two-stage approach since a firm is supposed
to decide the optimal mark-up that must be charged on its products, and, then, the quantity
that must be produced in each local market. The usual technique of the backward induction
leads us to solve the problem by deciding: firstly the optimal quantity that must be sold in
a deterministic framework of imperfect competition, and secondly the prices that maximize
the expected value of the firm’s intertemporal profits in a stochastic environment. In this
part, we assume, as it is usual in the literature about stochastic optimization,4 that the
firm is risk averse, since firms bear risk in destination markets.
We use the mathematical techniques applied in finance to solve a microeconomic problem
(namely, the delocation choice of a firm) in a dynamic and stochastic framework. That is,
1A very general presentation of continuous-time finance and portfolio theory can be found in Merton
(1990).
2Recently, other theoretical developments (see for instance, Lögfren et al., 1987, or Head et al., 2002)
have emphasized the role played by uncertainty in the behavioural models of firms in duopolistic setting by
concentrating on the interactive dimension.
3This is a very common strategy of firms (in industrialized countries), when they decide, for instance, to
locate part of their production in ex-socialist or less developped countries.
4Usually, the literature concerning bank regulation assumes risk averse behaviour for describing banks
(see, for instance, Koehn and Santomero, 1980; Kim and Santomero, 1988; and Keeley, 1990).
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in accord with Leland’s idea we use the stochastic dynamic optimization techinque (largely
used in finance) to analyse the investment decision of a (risk averse) firm.
In our setting, uncertainty is embedded in production costs (a firm faces in foreign
markets) that are modelled as time varying stochastic processes. This means that we
implicitly assume that uncertainty concerns the technology adopted by the firm in the
destination markets. Furthermore, as time passes, firms may acquire experiences in dealing
with such random enviroments, and thus reduce the risk they face.
A dynamic optimization framework supposes that firms maximize the expected intertem-
poral utility of their profits when incurring stochastic production costs in the foreign markets
(while they face deterministic costs in the home market). Following Leland’s (1972) intu-
ition, we model the production costs through a Wiener process (as stock prices in portfolio
theory).
In order to take into account the hypothesis of risk aversion, another distinguishing
feature of our setting is to model a utility function for the firm as a HARA (i.e. Hyperbolic
Absolute Risk Aversion) function. Thus, our model encompasses all the most widely used
utility functions. In such a way we are able to replicate the result of Sandmo (1971), but in
a more general setting. Indeed, Sandmo used CARA preferences which are a special case
of the HARAs.5
The relevance of our contribution is twofold: on one hand we introduce uncertainty
in the cost function firms face involving a time dimension. Furthermore, we allow firms
experience a learning process by letting the stochastic part of costs reduce while time is
running. On the other hand we are able to idenitfy the key elements that make the location
strategy consistent and efficient: discrimination and mark-ups. The economic intuition is
streightforward: firms manage the risk by charging higher prices in less risky markets. The
importance of being able to discriminate among markets follows. This is the core issue of
our contribution and makes our result closer to the existing empirical evidence cited above.
Indeed, in a monopolistic comepetitive (and deterministic) setting the mark-up level is
basically constant. Here, firms elaborate their strategies in a different manner by applying
different mark-ups and leaving room for dumping strategies.
Morevover, by applying HARA preferences we obtain an optimal mark-up as an affine
transformation of profits, while with CARA preferences we could have got an optimal mark-
up which is independent of the profit level, and with CRRA preferences an optimal mark-up
which is linear in the level of profits.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the main features of the
theoretical setting by presenting the behaviour of stochastic marginal costs and firm’s pref-
erences. In Section 3 we solve the optimization problem and we select the conditions under
which the mark-up discriminating strategy can arise. Finally, we compute the behaviour of
5Recall that Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA), Constant Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA),
quadratic, and log-utility functions are all paritcular cases of the HARA.
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both the optimal mark up and profit. Section 4 concludes.
2 The model
In order to assess to what extent uncertainty affects the delocation choice at firm level, we
develop a two-stage model. We evaluate the delocation choice of a group of firms when
they decide to enter n foreign symmetric markets rather than staying in the local (home)
market. Uncertainty is related to the choice of the investment and firms take their decision
on the basis of their utility function which takes account of uncertainty because of the lack
of knowledge about the social, economic, and political features of the destination markets.
Once firms have decided to locate in one or more of these markets, they start competing as
in a deterministic setting, namely they all maximize their profits by fixing their prices as
a mark-up on the costs and supplying a fixed quantity of goods (as in Dixit and Stiglitz,
1977). In the first step of our two-stage problem, a delocating firm chooses the mark-ups on
costs and then decides the quantities of goods that must be produced in each sub-market.
In order to solve this problem we apply a backward induction procedure. The first part of
the problem is solved in a fully deterministic environment, while the stochastic optimization
techniques will be applied in order to solve the second step of the problem (i.e. the profit
optimization with respect to prices).
We concentrate on a monopolistically competitive framework. At each moment in time,
a firm may simultaneously serve n+1 markets: the local (home) one and the n foreign ones.
We allow firms to serve local markets by setting up their plants there. Hence, once a firm
enters one of the n symmetric foreign markets, it starts competing with the other N − 2
foreign firms and with the local one.6 We peg our analysis on a monopolistic competition
framework by embracing a Dixit-Stiglitz’s view. Thus, the results obtained for one firm
remain valid for all of them.
Our setting lies on two main assumptions: (i) there exists an exogenously given number
of symmetric firms (N), and (ii) each of them gets can get losses or profits in each moment in
time and profits are fully shared among shareholders. In our economy, in each local market,
there are H shareholders that are also workers and consumers. In each local market, the
utility function (D) of a consumer j, Dj (j = 1...H), is a CES function:
Dj =
"
NX
i=1
d
σ−1
σ
i
# σ
σ−1
, σ > 1. (1)
This function consists of a composite index which is generated by the combination of
the consumption of the N different varieties of goods. Each consumer has a preference for
6 In this setting we are assuming that all firms are symmetric. It means that if one firm decides to locate
in a foreign market as an issue of a maximization process all the other N-1 firms will do the same.
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variety and consumes dj units of each variety according to the elasticity of substitution equal
to σ.This elasticity is the same for all consumers in a same market, but it can de different
across the various local markets. As mentioned above, each consumer is also simultaneously
worker and shareholder. The whole income of each consumer/workers (Yj) is given by:
Yj = w +N
πi
H
. (2)
where πi is the profit function of a firm.
Each consumer devotes all his income to consumption, and by maximizing (1) under
revenue constraint (2), for any pair of (l, k) of varieties we obtain :
dk =
·
pl
pk
¸σ
dl. (3)
The first order condition of this maximization problem give equality of the marginal
rate of substitution to the price ratio. We define the general price index of a market P as :
P =
"
NX
i=1
p1−σi
# 1
1−σ
.
The price index P corresponds to the minimum cost of purchasing a unite of the com-
posite good Dj .Hence, knowing that consumers devote all revenue to consumption we can
rewrite (2) as:
Yj = w +N
πi
H
= PDj , (4)
and by replacing (3) and (4) into (1), the demand function for the kth variety of goods
becomes:
dk =
pk
−σ
P 1−σ
Yj . (5)
Let us consider a particular firm producing one variety. Each firm produces one variety
of good by hiring workers. All firms are identical and each of them is expected to maximize
the following profit function facing a given wage. In each market :
πi = piqi − gi, (6)
amd we know that the cost function gi is related to the technology applied by the firm
and it is equal to
gi = wLi, (7)
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where Li is the number of worker hired by the firm.7 The technology of the firm is given
by
Li = fi + ciqi, (8)
where the workers Li produce qi units of good with a marginal cost ci and fixed costs
fi. Plugging (7) and (8) into (6), we maximize the resulting profits following Dixit-Stiglitz
(1977) and considering nominal wages as numéraire (that is w = 1).Each firm fixes its selling
prices as mark up over marginal costs:
pi = mici, with mi =
σ
σ − 1 . (9)
Knowing the demand function (5) and applying (4), the market clearing condition for
one variety (and by symmetry for all the others) may be written as:
qi = Hdi = H
·
pi
−σ
P 1−σ
Yj
¸
.
From the general index of prices and equation (9), we deduce that, at the equilibrium,
the price index coincide with the price fixed by a single firm. By this assumption, we are
able to rewrite the previous equation as:
qi =
1
pi
[H + piqi − ciqi − fi]
and, then, reduce it to:
qi =
H − fi
ci
, (10)
which is a valid solution for H > fi.
Once the demand faced by each firm is known, one can move to the first stage of the
problem: the location choice. Firms know that, once in the foreign local market, each of
them should provide a quantity qi of final good. However, when into one foreign market,
a firm must pay fixed costs (fi) in order to set up plants there and furthermore, there is
uncertainty related to the production conditions.8
We need to model the uncertainty linked to the foreign production costs. For each
firm, we assume that the local marginal cost is a deterministic value (cH), while the foreign
marginal cost (c) is described by a stochastic differential equation whose form is discussed
in detail in the next subsection. The rationale of this assumption is the following: the lack
of knowledge about the economic and political foreign environment makes a firm’s choices
7We assume that the labor force is homogeneous and there is not unemployment in this market.
8We mean that a firm usually has to face bureaucratic, instutitional, and financial problems in the foreign
environment that make the profitability of her investment more uncertain.
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more complicated and only firms founded there have a deep knowledge of the environment.
This status of uncertainty affects the investment returns.
An alternative way to model the uncertainty is to assume that both domestic and foreign
marginal costs are constant if they are expressed in their own currencies. So, the only risk
would be embedded in the exchange rate. In this way the foreign costs become stochastic
once they have been expressed in domestic currency.
In economic terms, most of the uncertainty related to foreign investments relies on the
problem repatriating part of the benefits earned in foreign markets. In particular, if the
exchange rate E follows a stochastic equation, while the foreign marginal cost (cE) is con-
stant, then the foreign marginal cost in domestic currency (c = cEE) behaves stochastically.
In this work we prefer to concentrate on modeling the foreign marginal costs instead of the
exchange rate in order to avoid any macroeconomic problem about the equilibrium value of
the exchange rate.
Before treating the structure of marginal costs, for sake of simplicity, we introduce some
notational simplifications. We call p ∈ Rn the vector of prices for the N local markets
(countries or regions) while pH is the price for the domestic market.
According to the results we previously cited, prices are defined as
p =Mc, (11)
where M ∈ Rn×n is the diagonal matrix containing all the mark-up parameters mi, ∀i ∈
{1, ..., n}. The corresponding mark-up equation for the domestic production implies
pH = mHcH . (12)
The firms are assumed to maximize their objective functions (i.e. intertemporal utility
of profits) with respect to both foreign and domestic mark-ups. The objective function
accounting for firm risk aversion will be widely described in Subsection 2.2.
2.1 The marginal costs
In our framework, the only source of risk for a firm is the marginal cost in the foreign mar-
kets (henceforth foreign marginal costs) whereas the domestic marginal cost is constant.
When a firm locates part of its production abroad, the corresponding marginal cost follows
a stochastic differential equation with a direct dependence on time and space. Quite rea-
sonably, we are assuming that such costs are not constant across time, since a firm may
develop learning procedures as well as accumulating experiences in dealing with production
in an international setting. In such a way, it may adapt better to the local environment,
and can manage (or control) the state of the risk more easily. In the same manner, the
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various local markets may display different levels of risk involving different factors that can
affect the firm’s choices. We model the dynamics of marginal costs as9
dc
n×1 = Ω (c, t)n×n
µ (t)
n×1
dt+ Ω (c, t)
n×n
Σ (t)0
n×k
dW
k×1
, c (t0) = c0, (13)
where W is k−dimensional Wiener process.10 Hereafter, the prime denotes transposition.
Equation (13) implies that the marginal costs follow a stochastic process made up of two
components that vary across time and space and may depend on all the foreign marginal
costs. This general setting allows us to account for the case where the marginal cost in
market i is affected by the costs of producing in all the other N − 1 foreign markets. The
values of all the costs are known in t0 (namely the initial period) and so c0 is a deterministic
vector of real (positive) variables.
The product Ωµ is called "drift" and represents the expected instantaneous variation
in costs through time. Instead, ΩΣ0 is called "diffusion" and measures the instantaneous
standard deviation of costs. Actually:11
Et [dc] = Ωµdt,
V art [dc] = ΩΣ
0ΣΩdt.
The vector c contains all the costs ci (∀i ∈ {1, ..., n}) of producing in each foreign sub-
market and each marginal cost ci is affected by a set of k risk sources (country risk, sector
risk, etc..) embedded in W .
The particular form we assumed for marginal costs in (13) implies that the drift and
diffusion terms must have a symmetric behavior with respect to c. Indeed, the same matrix
Ω (c, t) appears in both the drift and the diffusion component. This functional form simpli-
fies the mathematical computations; however, further extensions of our model will focus on
more general forms for the drift and the diffusion coefficients in (13).
Remark 1 The model presented in Equation (13) allows us to take into account a learning
process. As soon as firm’s knowledge of the economic conditions in foreign markets starts
improving, the volatility component decreases (i.e. the derivative of Σ (t) with respect to
time should be negative).
9The drift and diffusion terms Ω (c, t)µ (t) and Ω (c, t)Σ (t)0 are assumed to satisfy all the usual conditions
necessary for having a unique strong solution of this differential equation (see Karatzas and Shreve, 1991).
10As usual, all the stochastic processes belonging to W are assumed to be independent. This hypothesis
is made without loss of generality because the independent case can be easily traced back to the dependent
case by means of the Cholesky matrix.
11Here, Et is the expected value operator with respect to the information in t. The notation Et [•] is
sometimes replaced by the notation E [•| Ft] where the σ−algebra Ft embeds all the relevant information.
Furthermore, V art is the variance with respect to the information in t.
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The matrix Ω (c, t) is a diagonal matrix12 containing n functions, one for each foreign
market. Thus, Equation (13) can be written in a less compact form as follows:
d


c1
c2
...
cn

 =


ω1µ1
ω2µ2
...
ωnµn

 dt+


ω1σ11 ω1σ12 ... ω1σ1k
ω2σ21 ω2σ22 ... ω2σ2k
... ... ... ...
ωnσn1 ωnσn2 ... ωnσnk

 d


W1
W2
...
Wk

 ,
where σij (t) , i, j ∈ {1, ..., n} are elements of matrix Σ and the functional dependence on
costs and time have been omitted for the sake of simplicity. This extended form shows
that our model is sufficiently general to allow the embedding also of the case of correlated
costs of production among the different foreign markets. This correlation appears via the
matrix Σ. When Σ is a diagonal matrix (i.e. σij (t) = 0, ∀i 6= j) then the marginal costs of
production in different markets are independent.
Particular examples may be generated by choosing particular forms for the matrix
Ω (c, t).
Case 1 (The geometric Brownian costs). When the matrix Ω (c, t) appears as
Ω =


c1 0 ... 0
0 c2 ... 0
... ... ... ...
0 0 ... cn

 ,
then each marginal cost ci in (13) follows a geometric Brownian motion, i.e.
dci = ciµi (t) dt+ ciΣi (t)
0
dW,
where Σi is the ith column of matrix Σ. In this case, the production costs in a sub-market
are not affected by the production costs in all the other sub-markets.
Case 2 (The mean reverting costs). When the matrix Ω (c, t) appears as
Ω =


ξ1 − c1 0 ... 0
0 ξ2 − c2 ... 0
... ... ... ...
0 0 ... ξn − cn

 ,
then Equation (13) for the element ci can be written as
dci = µi (t) (ξi − ci) dt+ (ξi − ci)Σ (t)0i dW,
12 Its elements ωij (c, t) , i, j ∈ {1, ..., n} are such that ωij (c, t) = 0, ∀i 6= j.
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where, as in the previous case, Σi is the ith column of matrix Σ. In this model the para-
meters ξi play the role of the “equilibrium values” for the marginal costs. When ci equals
ξi, the marginal cost becomes deterministic and constant. By contrast, when ci is higher
(lower) than its equilibrium value, the market forces (whose strength is measured by µi)
bring ci back towards the value ξi. In both the cases, the farther ci from its equilibrium
value, the higher its volatility (which is proportional to (ξi − ci)2).
As we have already stated, the domestic marginal cost (cH) is constant, therefore, by
equation (10), the quantity of good a firm can sell in the domestic market (qH) is a constant
as well. The analogy with the asset allocation problem suggests that the domestic marginal
cost plays the same role as the riskless asset. This is a particular result stemming from the
adoption of risk aversion hypothesis: any risk averse investor always includes in her portfolio
a quota of the riskless asset. In this setting, any entrepreneur chooses to set up part of the
production in the home market. In case we are referring to foreign markets, we assume that
the firm knows the value of marginal costs at time it enters in the market (t = 0), that is c0
(according to equation (13). Hence, at that moment, each firm can fix the quantity it can
produce and sell in each foreign markets as a constant as well. In our framework, we make
the assumption that when a firm starts producing in a market, it builts a new plant that is
able to produce the quantity qi (stated at t = 0) for ever. In case of demand fluctuations,
the exceeding quantity can be stocked with no additional costs.13
Let us define the vectors of prices and quantities (produced and sold in the foreign
markets) as follows:
p
n×1
≡


p1
p2
...
pn

 , q
n×1
≡


q1
q2
...
qn

 .
The corresponding domestic variables are pH and qH .
By our previous assumption and by the outcomes of the second stage, we know that
both the final level of demand qi (∀i ∈ {1, ..., n}) and the domestic demand qH are constant.
When a firm locates part of its production in foreign local markets, we assume that its
total profits (earned in local and foreign markets) turn out to be
π = qH (pH − cH) + q0(p− c)− F, (14)
where F is the the amount of fixed costs faced by the firm for building the new plants.14
13We are implicitly considering the situation of not fashionable or not perishable goods.
14For the sake of simplicity, we apply a linear transformation of the technology previously described in
order to get an expression displaying the marginal cost of output. In that sense, F stands for the whole sum
of fixed costs a firm incurs in each destination.
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By plugging pH and p from (11) and (12) into (14), we get
π = qH (mH − 1) cH + q0 (M − I) c− F,
where I ∈ Rn×n is an identity matrix. The profit is maximized with respect to the mark-
ups. Nevertheless, since the quantities q and qH are constant, then for the sake of simplicity
we define the new following control variables
x ≡ (M − I) q, (15)
xH ≡ (mH − 1) qH .
It will be straightforward to compute the optimal values of the mark-ups after solving
the optimal control problem for x and xH . As a consequence of this change of variables,
the profit may be rewritten as
π = xHcH + x
0c− F, (16)
whose Itô’s differential is given by 15
dπ = x0dc+ cHdxH + (dx)0 (c+ dc) .
The usual self-financing condition implies
cHdxH + (dx)
0 (c+ dc) = 0,
which means that there are neither external contributions nor external withdrawals from
firm’s profit. Finally, after expressing costs in terms of profits, the profit dynamic behavior
is given by the stochastic differential equation
dπ = x0Ωµdt+ x0ΩΣ0dW, (17)
where the functional dependences have been omitted for the sake of simplicity. The only
control variable is now x while xH will be easily recovered from Equation (16).
2.2 The firm risk aversion
In this subsection we model the risk aversion of the firm. Thus, we need a formal device
to describe how firms cope with the risk. According to Asplund (2002) there are some
reasons which cause firms to act in a risk-averse way, for instance non-diversified owners,
liquidity constraints or non-linear tax systems. Even the delegation of control decisions to a
risk-adverse manager who is paid according to firm’s performance may produce risk averse
15We recall that c and x are stochastic variables. Accordingly, the product of their differentials (dx)0 (dc)
cannot be neglected as in the usual chain rule for the differentiation.
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behaviour of the firm. Banal and Ottaviani (2004) add also that risk aversion makes firms
more concerned about low-profits states due to low level of demand or high costs. They try
to have good performances in these hard times at the cost of reducing profits in good times.
In a dynamic setting, a risk neutral firm would simply maximize its intertemporal ex-
pected profit. Therefore, under the risk neutral assumption, each firm would impose an in-
finite mark-up on the foreign market with the lowest cost (as we describe below). However,
when thinking of the foreign investment option, under the strong uncertainty assumption,
such beahviour is not rational. The best way to take into account this new dimension is by
modelling the firm attitude towards risk by an increasing and strictly concave transforma-
tion of its profits. This kind of transformation is the standard von Neumann- Morgenstern
utility function applied to firm profits.
In this analysis, we select a general form of utility function: the so-called HARA (Hy-
perbolic Absolute Risk Aversion) family. In algebraic terms the HARA utility function can
be written as function of firm profits (π)
U (π) = δ (γπ − α)1−
β
γ .
In order to have a well defined maximization problem, we need the utility function to be
increasing and concave in its argument (here, profits). These conditions lead the following
restrictions on the parameters:
∂U
∂π
> 0 =⇒ δ (γ − β) > 0,
∂2U
∂π2
< 0 =⇒ −βδ (γ − β) < 0,
and we obtain
β > 0, δ (γ − β) > 0. (18)
The Arrow-Pratt absolute risk aversion indexR computed for U is a hyperbolic function
of π:
R ≡ −∂
2U
∂π2
µ
∂U
∂π
¶−1
=
β
γπ − α. (19)
Notice that the index R is inversely proportional to the firm profit. It implies that a
higher level of profits yields a lower level of R. This means that firms with high profits are
less risk averse.
If we want to avoid negative profits at any point in time, then parameter α plays a
crucial role. In fact, if α ≥ 0, then it turns out to be a measure of the minimum acceptable
profit level (as set out in Karatzas and Shreve, 1998, for the subsistence consumption level
in the case of consumption and investment optimization). This result can be easily derived
by computing the marginal utility of the profit:
∂U
∂π
= δ (γ − β) (γπ − α)−
β
γ .
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When β/γ > 0, there exists a level of profit (equal to α/γ) leading to an infinite marginal
utility. As a consequence of that, if the profit reaches the value α/γ, the firm would get
an infinite increase in its utility by augmenting its profits (even by a very small amount).16
This means that the optimal profit will never fall to the value α/γ. Thus, in this analysis
we exclude the non-negativity constraint on profits by assuming that α/γ ≥ 0.
One can think about other ways to model the risk aversion of firms, but the HARA
utility function is the most general one since it takes into account a quite large range of
preferences, and most of the other functions applied in economic theory can be derived
directly from it. For instance:
1. By imposing α = 0 and γ = 1, the HARA function becomes a CRRA (Constant
Relative Risk Aversion) utility function in the form U (R) = δc1−β; with the minimal
profit level equal to zero;
2. by assuming α = −1 and with γ approaching zero, the HARA function converts into
the CARA (Constant Absolute Risk Aversion) utility function in the form U (R) =
δe−βc.17 In such a case, there does not exist any finite and non-negative level of profits
giving an infinite marginal utility; thus, for CARA preferences the non-negativity
constraint on profit should be explicitly imposed;
3. in case α = 0, γ = 1, δ = (1− β)−1 and β approaches to one, the HARA function
provides the same results as the log utility function;
4. when 1− β
γ
= 2 , the HARA reduces to the quadratic utility function.
3 The profit optimization
Each firm intertemporally maximizes the expected utility of its profits. This is a dynamic
problem where the intertemporal utility function is maximized with respect to the mark-
up given the dynamic behaviours of both costs and profits (represented by two vector
differential equations). Keeping in mind the contents of the previous section, the firm’s
programme can be written as18



maxx Et0
hR∞
t0
e−ρ(t−t0) (γπ (t)− α)1−
β
γ dt
i
dc (t) = Ω (c, t)µ (t) dt+Ω (c, t)Σ (t)0 dW,
dπ (t) = x0Ω (c, t)µdt+ x0Ω (c, t)Σ (t)0 dW,
(20)
16This would be possible by investing only in the domestic production, for instance.
17 In this case, according to Conditions (18), the parameter δ must be negative.
18Recall that the variable x is a linear transformation of the mark-ups, as in (15).
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where ρ is the constant subjective discount rate. The optimal mark-ups (m) solving Problem
(20) are shown in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 The optimal foreign mark-ups solving Problem (20) in presence of constant
domestic marginal costs, are
m∗ = 1+
γπ − α
β
I−1q Ω
−1 ¡Σ0Σ¢−1 µ, (21)
where 1 ∈ Rn is a vector of 1s. The optimal domestic mark-up is
m∗H = 1 +
1
cHqH
µ
π + F − γπ − α
β
c0Ω−1
¡
Σ0Σ
¢−1
µ
¶
. (22)
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
Remark 2 The result of the optimization problem does not hold when Σ (t) approaches zero
(see Equations (21) and (22)). Thus, even taking into account the case with a decreasing
volatility of foreign marginal costs (i.e. of a learning process), the result stated in Proposition
1 cannot be extended to the case where some costs become fully deterministic. In this
last situation the optimal strategy would consist of choosing the lowest costs among the
deterministic ones and investing in the remaining countries according to Proposition 1.
The mark-ups in (21) and (22) rely on the profit level. This is an implication of choosing
a HARA utility function. It embeds the assumption that firms display different risk aversion
according to their profit levels. A firm earning high profits has a tendency to apply higher
mark-ups than firm with low profits. In addition, the endogeneity that relates mark-ups and
profits is just apparent because the optimal profit is a function containing only parameters
(as we are going to show in the next section).
Also note that:
1. The mark-up is increasing in the profit. This means that more profitable firms impose
higher mark-ups. This outcome is more precise than that proposed by Sandmo (1971)
when using a constant absolute risk aversion utility function (for firms). It is possible
to recover his result by fixing α = −1 and letting γ tend to zero. One can immediately
check from Equations (21) and (22) that when γ tends to zero, the optimal mark-ups
do not depend on the level of profits. Nevertheless, our model also includes the case
of a firm exhibiting a decreasing risk aversion index. When profits increase, the firm
becomes less risk averse and so it can charge a higher level of mark-up for goods
produced and sold in the foreign markets.
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2. The only mark-up depending on fixed costs is the domestic one. Because of its risk
aversion, the firm prefers to charge these costs just on the domestic mark-up since the
domestic market has no risk.
3.1 The mark-up discrimination
As shown in Proposition 1 there exists an optimal level of mark-up for each foreign market.
Thus, the usual result of a constant mark-up across markets does not hold. In this sub-
section, we consider to what extent the discrimination between the domestic and foreign
mark ups can actually be a profitable strategy for firms. In particular, we concentrate on
the situtation where the firm charges a higher mark up in the foreign markets than in the
local one. This situation happens if and only if the inequality
m∗ > m∗H1, (23)
holds, where 1 is a vector of 1s. As shown in Appendix A.2 inequality (23) holds when
m∗ − 1 > π + F
cHqH + c0q
1. (24)
Since π + F is usually known as contribution margin , we have the following.
Proposition 2 The firm solving the maximization problem (20) successfully applies a strat-
egy imposing foreign mark-ups higher than domestic ones, if and only if the net foreign
mark-ups (i.e. m∗ − 1) are greater than the ratio between the contribution margin (namely
the sum of profits and fixed costs) and total variable costs .
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
Proposition 2 implies that, under likely conditions, dumping19 is an optimal strategy for
firms disciminating mark-ups. Now, we are interested in finding an easy way for checking
whether firms profitably apply a dumping strategy. In particular, inequality (24) may be
rewritten as
m∗ >
π + cHqH + c
0q + F
cHqH + c0q
1, (25)
so that a corollary follows easily.
19Remember that dumping is defined as charging higher prices in the local market than in the foreign
ones.
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Corollary 3 The firm solving Problem (20) may select a discriminating strategy when the
foreign mark-ups (i.e. m∗) are greater than the ratio of total revenues to total variable costs.
From a policy viewpoint, the results stated in Proposition 2 and Corollay 3 can be
useful for implementing a regulation strategy. A discriminating mark-up strategy yields
price discrimination which may take the appearance of dumping. In order to improve the
contents and effectiveness of an anti-dumping regulation, the regulator should just gather
information about the following data: (i) the firm contribution margin (or total revenues),
(ii) the firm total variable costs, and (iii) the firm mark-ups on foreign markets. If the
reverse of condition (24) holds, then there is room for a dumping strategy. Hence, the need
of a regulation policy appears.
Remark 4 When firms solve Problem (20), a regulator could prevent firms from applying
a dumping policy by stating the following rule: the mark-up on foreign markets must not be
lower than the ratio between total returns and total variable costs.
3.2 The behaviour of optimal mark-ups
Even if the total amount of profits is always positive (as we will show in the next section), we
are interested in checking whether it is optimal for firms to allow losses in some markets that
are compensated by higher profits in other markets. This is equivalent to look for mark-ups
higher (lower) than 1 generating a profit (loss). Hence, we investigate the behaviour of the
optimal mark-up and we check in Equation (21) if the elements of the vector
γπ − α
β
I−1q Ω
−1 ¡Σ0Σ¢−1 µ,
are positive or negative. The form of the utility function guarantees that the optimal value
of profits never falls below α/γ (i.e. γπ (t)−α > 0, ∀t ≥ t0). Moreover, the quadratic form
Σ0Σ is always positive semi-definite and µ can be assumed to be a vector of positive functions
with respect to time without loss of generality. Finally, q is a vector of positive constants.
This means that the elements of the vector m∗ are higher (lower) than 1 depending on the
sign of the elements in the matrix Ω.
Let us go back to the previous cases in order to check whether, in those cases, the mark
ups are higher or lower than 1.
Case 1 (The geometric Brownian costs). A variable following a geometric Brownian
motion has always positive values, so that Ω (containing the elements of c) is always positive
definite and the optimal mark-ups given in (21) are always greater than one.
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Accordingly, we can conclude.
Proposition 3 When the foreign marginal costs follow geometric Brownian motions (i.e.
ωi,j = 0,∀i 6= j and ωi,i = ci) and the domestic marginal cost is constant, then the optimal
foreign mark-ups are all greater than 1.
We now turn to the case of mean reverting costs.
Case 2 (The mean reverting cost).When it is possible to invest only in one foreign
country (i.e. n = 1), the optimal mark-up (21) is
m∗ = 1 +
γπ − α
β
µ
(ξ − c) qσ2 .
Thus, when c is under its equilibrium level (i.e. c < ξ) the optimal mark-up is greater than
one and vice versa, when c is over its equilibrium value (i.e. c > ξ) the optimal mark-up
is lower than one. We stress that once the costs reach their equilibrium values (i.e. c = ξ),
the optimal mark-up tends towards infinity because, under this assumption, there is no more
uncertainty. This issue is strongly related to the assumption of fixed quantities. Actually, if
one allowed for variable quantities, this result would be different.
As will be argued in detail in the following subsection, for any mark-up, the optimal
profit always remains positive. Thus, we will not be concerned with the case where the
mark-ups are less than one, since, even in this case, the optimal strategy will always lead
to the sum of profits over all locations being positive. When the foreign mark-ups are lower
than one (m∗ < 1),20 it is easy to check from Proposition 1 that the value of the domestic
mark-up is higher than the value it takes when m∗ > 1. Hence, the loss incurred in the
foreign market is compensated for by the additional earnings in the domestic one.
3.3 The optimal profit
Once we have found the optimal mark-up strategy we are able to compute the optimal level
of profits a firm gets under the delocation assumption. The behaviour of the optimal profit
can be easily obtained by plugging the value of x∗ from (31) into the differential equation
(17) for π. We obtain
dπ =
γπ − α
β
µ0
¡
Σ0Σ
¢−1
µdt+
γπ − α
β
µ0
¡
Σ0Σ
¢−1
Σ0dW,
20 In this case the inequality between vectors means that each element of m∗ must be less than 1.
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which is a linear stochastic differential equation in π whose solution exists in a closed form
according to the following proposition.
Proposition 4 The optimal profit is given by
π∗ (t) = Φ (t0, t)π (t0) +
α
β
µ
γ
β
− 1
¶Z t
t0
λ (s)0 λ (s)Φ (s, t) ds (26)
−α
β
Z t
t0
λ (s)0Φ (s, t) dW (s) ,
where
Φ (t0, t) = exp
½
γ
β
µ
1− γ
2β
¶Z t
t0
λ (τ)0 λ (τ) dτ +
γ
β
Z t
t0
λ (τ)0 dW (τ)
¾
,
λ (t) ≡ Σ (t)
¡
Σ (t)0Σ (t)
¢−1
µ (t) .
Proof. See Kloeden and Platen (1992, Paragraph 4.2).
As one can check in Equation (26), a relevant measure of the optimal location choice
(that replicates the portfolio choice) is given by λ. In order to give it an economic interpre-
tation, we rewrite its value in scalar terms:
λ =
µ
σ
.
As µ is the expected value (mean value) of c and σ is its standard deviation, λ is the inverse
of the variation coefficient of the marginal cost. Therefore, λ measures the expected cost in
terms of risk and it represents an easy way of taking into account, simultaneously, the first
and second moment of the stochastic variable c.
The optimal profit in (26) contains one component proportional to the initial profit
π (t0), and two components proportional to α which is a measure of the minimum level of
profit (α/γ). It is easy to show that the expected optimal profit never falls below the value
α/γ. After stressing that the expected value of the particular function Φ (t, t0) is given by21
Et0 [Φ (t, t0)] = exp
½
γ
β
Z t
t0
λ (τ)0 λ (τ) dτ
¾
,
the expected value of the optimal profit is
Et0 [π∗ (t)] = π (t0)Et0 [Φ (t0, t)] (27)
+
α
β
µ
γ
β
− 1
¶Z t
t0
λ (s)0 λ (s)Et0
·
Φ (t0, t)
Φ (t0, s)
¸
ds.
21Recall that Φ is log-normally distributed.
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Remark 5 In order to have a strictly concave utility function, we need to assume α ≥ 0,
and β > 0 Now, let us add γ/β > 1 (which is compatible with Conditions (18) when δ > 0).
Hence, since Φ (t0, t) > 0, ∀t ≥ t0, we can conclude that the expected optimal profit never
falls below the initial value π (t0). Nevertheless, the initial value of profit must be greater
than α/γ for the objective function to be well behaved. This means that Et0 [π∗ (t)] never
falls below α/γ, or put differently, when delocating, firms always experience a minimum
positive level of profits as a whole.
When the minimum profit stands at zero (i.e. α = 0 and firm’s preferences belong to
the CRRA family) the optimal profit function reduces to
π∗ (t) = Φ (t0, t)π (t0) ,
and the optimal profit turns out to be just a geometric Brownian motion. Under this
hypothesis, Φ (t0, t) plays the role of a stochastic capitalization factor.
By contrast, when firm’s preferences are of the CARA type (i.e. α = −1 and γ → 0) we
get
π∗ (t) = π (t0) +
1
β
Z t
t0
λ (s)0 λ (s) ds+
1
β
Z t
t0
λ (s)0 dW (s) , (28)
and its expected value is
Et0 [π∗ (t)] = π (t0) +
1
β
Z t
t0
λ (s)0 λ (s) ds.
Nevertheless, even if in the case of CARA functions the expected optimal profit never
falls below its initial value, the same property does not hold for the optimal profit π∗ that
could take even negative values, as one can easily see from Equation (28). As previously
mentioned, when using CARA preferences a non negative constraint on π should be explic-
itly imposed. This is the reason for CRRA preferences to prevail in the literature.
4 Conclusions
In this study we focused on the intertemporal optimal behavior of a firm that decides
to locate part of its production in different (foreign) markets rather than concentrate all
the production in its headquarters.We developed a model where a delocating firm meets
stochastic foreign production costs since it faces uncertainty in the new destination markets.
The domestic marginal costs are assumed to be constant. Firms are assumed to be risk
averse and operate in a monopolistic competition setting. By exploiting portfolio choice
techniques, the optimal behaviour of the firm (facing such a stochastic environment) is
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to charge different mark-ups for different destinations. In the general case of hyperbolic
absolute risk aversion preferences, the mark-up is increasing in the level of profits.
Because of the constant domestic marginal cost hypothesis, all the fixed costs for de-
locating the firm’s plants are charged to the domestic mark-up. The firm’s risk aversion
makes the firm itself charge higher mark-ups in the less uncertain markets (and the domestic
market is fully deterministic).
We also show that under a suitable condition on the firm’s contribution margin (or
total revenues) and total variable costs, a mark-up discrimination policy turns out to be an
optimal strategy. Moreover, and in contrast with the deterministic results, in the case of
mean reverting costs, a firm can get optimal positive profits even when charging a mark-up
less than one (consequently the domestic mark-up will be higher).
This analysis can be extended in a number of directions. On one hand, it could be worth
generalizing the setting to other forms of competition among firms as well as introducing a
more general demand function. On the other hand, still under the assumption of monop-
olistic competition, it could be interesting to compare the location option (in the sense of
foreign investment option) with the export one, but accounting for transport costs (and so,
including a spatial dimension).
A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The Hamiltonian of Problem (20) is22
H = e−ρ(t−t0) (γπ − α)1−βγ + J 0cΩµ+ Jπx0Ωµ
+
1
2
tr
¡
ΩΣ0ΣΩJcc
¢
+
1
2
Jππx
0ΩΣ0ΣΩx+ x0ΩΣ0ΣΩJcπ,
where J (c, π, t) is the value function solving Problem (20). The subscripts on J mean
partial derivatives.
The first order condition for x on H gives the system
∂H
∂x
= JπΩµ+ JππΩΣ
0ΣΩx+ΩΣ0ΣΩJcπ = 0
⇒ x∗ = − Jπ
Jππ
Ω−1
¡
Σ0Σ
¢−1
µ− 1
Jππ
Jcπ, (29)
and the second order condition holds if the matrix
∂H
∂c0∂c
= JππΩΣ
0ΣΩ,
22Recall that Ω is symmetric (i.e. Ω = Ω0).
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is negative definite. Since ΩΣ0ΣΩ is a quadratic form and always positive semidefinite, then
the second order condition holds if the value function J is concave in π. As the objective
function is strictly concave in π, J will be too. This property will be evident in what
follows.23
After substituting the optimal value of x into the Hamiltonian, we obtain the following
partial differential equation called Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation (hereafter HJB):24
0 = Jt + e
−ρ(t−t0) (γπ − α)1−
β
γ + J 0cΩµ−
Jπ
Jππ
Ωµ0Jcπ
−1
2
J2π
Jππ
µ0
¡
Σ0Σ
¢−1
µ+
1
2
tr
¡
ΩΣ0ΣΩJcc
¢
− 1
2
1
Jππ
J 0cπΩΣ
0ΣΩJcπ,
whose solution is the value function. Furthermore, the boundary (transversality) condition
lim
t→∞
J (t, π) = 0,
must hold.
The value function often inherits its functional form from the utility function. Thus, we
now try the functional form
J (π, c, t) = e−ρ(t−t0)V (c, t) (γπ − α)1−
β
γ , (30)
where V (c, t) is a function whose form must be determined. After replacing this expression
into the HJB equation and carrying out a few algebraic simplifications, we obtain
0 = Vt +
γ
β
µ0ΩVc +
1
2
tr
¡
ΩΣ0ΣΩVcc
¢
+
µ
1
2
µ
γ
β
− 1
¶
µ0
¡
Σ0Σ
¢−1
µ− ρ
¶
V + 1
+
1
2
µ
γ
β
− 1
¶
1
V
V 0cΩΣ
0ΣΩVc.
Recall that the scalar µ0 (Σ0Σ)−1 µ does not depend on c. Hence, the suitable function
V (c, t) solving this partial differential equation must be independent of c as well. In this
case the matrices Vc and Vcc contain only zeros and V (t) solves
0 = Vt +
µ
1
2
µ
γ
β
− 1
¶
µ0
¡
Σ0Σ
¢−1
µ− ρ
¶
V + 1,
23The reader is referred to Fleming and Soner (1993) for the assumptions that must hold on the function
U (π) for having a strictly concave value function.
24For a complete exposition of the derivation of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation the reader is
referred to Duffie (1996), Björk (1998), and Øksendal (2000).
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which must satisfy the boundary condition
lim
t→∞
V (t) = 0.
This ordinary differential equation has one and only one solution. Nevertheless, the
form of this solution is not relevant for our purpose. Indeed, when the value function (30)
is plugged into (29) we get 25
x∗ =
γπ − α
β
Ω−1
¡
Σ0Σ
¢−1
µ, (31)
where the function V does not play any role.
Remember that the form of x defined in (15) to obtain the optimal value of the mark-up
(M∗) is given by
x∗ =M∗q − q.
The matrix product M∗q can be written as m∗Iq where m∗ ∈ Rn is a vector containing
the optimal values of the mark-ups while Iq ∈ Rn×n is a diagonal matrix containing the
elements of vector q. Finally, the optimal value for the domestic mark-up can be obtained
from (16).
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Inequality (23) implies
1+
γπ − α
β
I−1q Ω
−1 ¡Σ0Σ¢−1 µ > 1+ 1
cHqH
µ
π + F − γπ − α
β
c0Ω−1
¡
Σ0Σ
¢−1
µ
¶
1,
which can be written as
γπ − α
β
µ
I−1q Ω
−1 ¡Σ0Σ¢−1 µ+ 1
cHqH
c0Ω−1
¡
Σ0Σ
¢−1
µ1
¶
>
π + F
cHqH
1.
Now we use the properties of the Kronecker product (⊗)26 in order to write
γπ − α
β
µ
I−1q +
1
cHqH
¡
c0 ⊗ 1
¢¶
Ω−1
¡
Σ0Σ
¢−1
µ >
π + F
cHqH
1,
25Recall that ∂V∂c = 0 and thus
∂J
∂c = 0.
26Kronecker product (⊗) has the following properties
A
n×m
⊗ B
k×l
= C
(n·k)×(m·l)
≡


a11B a12B ... a1mB
a21B a12B ... a2mB
... ... ... ...
an1B an2B ... annB

 ,
(A⊗B)−1 = A−1 ⊗B−1, (A⊗B)0 = A0 ⊗B0,
(A⊗B) (C ⊗D) = AC ⊗BD.
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and, finally
γπ − α
β
I−1q Ω
−1 ¡Σ0Σ¢−1 µ > (π + F ) ¡cHqHI + ¡c0 ⊗ 1¢ Iq¢−1 1.
It is easy to prove that the following equality holds¡
cHqHI +
¡
c0 ⊗ 1
¢
Iq
¢−1
1 =
¡
cHqH + c
0q
¢−1
1.
Now, since c0Ω−1 (Σ0Σ)−1 µ is a scalar, we can write
c
0Ω−1
¡
Σ0Σ
¢−1
µ⊗ 1,
and
c
0Ω−1
¡
Σ0Σ
¢−1
µ⊗ 1 =
¡
c
0 ⊗ 1
¢
Ω−1
¡
Σ0Σ
¢−1
µ.
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